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ATTORNEY ADVERTISING IS COMMERCIAL SPEECH
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
Bates v. State Bar
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. O'Brien,' the Supreme Court stated what one
respected commentator, John Hart Ely, believes is the general analytic
framework within which the Court adjudicates the constitutionality of laws
that in some way impinge upon an individual's right of freedom of speech.2
The O'Brien Court said that a governmental regulation that allegedly
violates the first amendment is constitutionally sound (1) "if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest;" (2) "if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;" and (3) "if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."'3 Professor Ely has
suggested that the second criterion of this test serves a switching function.4
When the Court finds that a challenged regulation is related to the
suppression of free expression, its constitutionality will be determined under
a rigorous categorization analysis. Ely has indicated that a court, when
determining whether a law is related to the suppression of information,
should analyze the causal connection between the asserted state interest and
the regulation designed to achieve this interest. The critical question would
be
whether the harm that the state is seeking to avert is one that grows out
of the fact that the defendant is communicating, and more particularly
out of the way people can be expected to react to his message, or rather
would arise even if the defendant's conduct had no communicative
significance whatever. 5
Where the regulation is found to be related to the suppression of free
expression, it will be upheld only if the suppressed speech is found to fall
within one of a small number of categories of unprotected speech that the
Supreme Court in prior decisions has established as being amenable to
comprehensive state regulation. 6 Traditionally, these unprotected categories
1. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
2. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1484 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Ely].
3. 391 U.S. at 377 (numbers in parentheses added).
4. Ely, supra note 2, at 1484.
5. Id. at 1497 (footnote omitted).
6. Id. at 1496-1502. But see The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56,
145-47 & nn.23-36 (1976). The author of this student piece contends that two recent
Supreme Court cases, Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976), indicate that the Court may have abandoned this analysis. Instead, it is
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have been obscenity,7 libel,8 fighting words, 9 and any speech that satisfied
some variant of the clear and present danger test.' ° Where, however, the
regulation is found to be unrelated to the suppression of free expression, that
is, where the harm that the state is seeking to avoid does not stem from the
way people may be expected to react to a particular communication, a
balancing approach will be utilized 1 to determine whether the state's
interest is sufficient to justify any incidental effects which the regulation
might have on an individual's first amendment rights.
Although the Court has never explicitly stated that commercial speech
falls within the set of unprotected categories,12 it initially treated commer-
cial speech as serving little, if any, first amendment interest. The anomalous
situation existed whereby the Court permitted lower courts to deny
constitutional protection to this speech, not explicitly singled out as
unprotected, even where it was the subject of a regulation that suppressed its
suggested that where a suppression is found the Court will subject the regulation to
"exacting scrutiny" requiring: (1) that the state's interest be compelling; (2) that the
chosen means substantially further those interests; and (3) that the challenged
regulation be the least intrusive way of achieving the government's purposes. It is not
exactly clear, however, that the regulations involved in Elrod and in Buckley were
suppressions of speech. Indeed, in a footnote to the Elrod opinion the Court implied
that the legislation in Buckley did not "'focus on the ideas expressed by persons or
groups subjected to [it] .... ' 427 U.S. at 363 n.17 (quoting Buckely, 424 U.S. at 17).
Elrod, however, does appear to evaluate a regulation which is related to the
suppression of free expression. There, plaintiffs challenged the system of political
patronage as it was practiced in Cook County, Illinois, where state job holders were
fired if they did not manifest loyalty to the political party in power. The restriction
was clearly directed at the content of the ideas expressed. It would appear, therefore,
that Elrod does not comport with Professor Ely's analysis.
7. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957).
8. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
9. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
10. See, e.g., Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
11. Professor Ely notes that the Court has established two balancing techniques.
The weaker approach asks only whether there exists any "less restrictive alternative
capable of serving the state's interest as efficiently as it is served by the regulation
under attack." Ely, supra note 2, at 1484-85 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
This formulation would invalidate only laws that can be said to gratuitously inhibit
expression. The stronger approach implies real balancing. It asks whether there are
alternatives available, and, if so, whether the marginally greater effectiveness of the
original regulation justifies its greater burden on communication. Ely states that the
strong balancing approach is ordinarily used-when dealing with "traditional" modes
of expression, such as circulation of pamphlets, picketing, public speeches, and rallies.
Id. at 1488, 1490.
12. See Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech
and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 430-31 (1971). The
author notes that the Court "seems to" apply the protected-unprotected approach to
commercial speech. In fact, it has never included commercial speech within the litany
of categories which it has noted as unprotected. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809, 819 (1975). Professor Redish argues that commercial speech is not in the same
class as libel, slander, fighting words, or incitement because, unlike those forms of
speech, it is not harmful in and of itself.
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dissemination. 13 Recently, however, the Court has reevaluated the first
amendment interests represented by commercial speech. First in the area of
product advertising, then extending its reasoning to cover professional
advertising, the Court has stated that commercial communications contain
valuable information that should be protected by the first amendment.
Although the Court has continued to recognize that certain "common sense
differences" between commercial and other varieties of speech dictate that it
should be treated somewhat differently, it now appears that the Court is
unlikely to uphold a state regulation designed to suppress commercial
speech because of the effect which that speech may have upon its recipients.
Instead, the Court is likely to apply an analysis containing elements of both
an exacting scrutiny test,14 and the categorization approach described by
Professor Ely. The application of this analysis will almost inevitably result
in the striking down of any regulation that suppresses commercial
information.
This Note will trace the history and evolution of the Court's treatment of
commercial speech. Next, it will discuss the recent case of Bates v. State
Bar,'5 where a five member majority of the Court concluded that a state
regulation prohibiting advertising by attorneys violated the first amend-
ment. Finally, this Note will discuss the recently adopted amendments to the
American Bar Association's rules on attorney advertising. It will examine
these rules in light of the Bates decision to determine whether they present
any significant constitutional problems.
HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Until recently, it had been widely accepted that commercial speech was
outside the scope of first amendment protection. 16 This understanding of
what was known as the "commercial speech exception" derived from the
Supreme Court's opinion in the 1942 case of Valentine v. Chrestensen. 7
In Chrestensen, the owner and exhibitor of a submarine, upon
attempting to distribute handbills soliciting paying visitors, was advised of
an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of commercial advertising matter
in city streets, but was informed that circulation of handbills devoted to
social protest was permissible. He then circulated a second bill identical to
the first but containing a protest against the City Dock Department on the
reverse side. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found this political
13. See, e.g., Capital Broadcasting Cq. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971),
aff'd sub noma. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000
(1972).
14. See note 6 supra.
15. 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
16. See, e.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); United States v.
Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); Developments in the
Law - Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1027 (1967).
17. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). For a discussion of the Court's treatment of commercial
speech prior to Chrestensen, see Bayus, The Constitutional Status of Commercial
Expression, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 761, 765-68 (1976).
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protest sufficient to invoke first amendment protection.18 The Supreme Court
did not. In upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance, the Court
merely stated that the Constitution imposes no restraints upon a state when
that state regulates the dissemination of commercial advertising.19 Despite
the Court's failure to provide rationale or authority supporting its decision, 20
it did imply that commercial advertising - commercial speech - does not
communicate information or ideas that the first amendment protects.
After Chrestensen, the Supreme Court further developed its policy that
commercial communications do not enjoy first amendment protection. In
Breard v. City of Alexandria,21 the Court concluded that an ordinance
making it a misdemeanor to solicit for sale, or sell, goods, wares, or
merchandise at private residences without having been invited by the owner
or occupant was constitutional when applied to the door-to-door selling of
magazine subscriptions. The Court distinguished Martin v. City of
Struthers,22 where an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door distribution of
handbills had been held unconstitutional. It noted that in Martin the
ordinance at issue forbade the distribution of all handbills or circulars,.
18. Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941), rev'd, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
A majority of the Second Circuit believed the second, two-sided, handbill deserved
constitutional protection. Speaking for the majority, Judge Clark expressed his belief
that an absolute prohibition against commercial handbilling would be of "doubtful
validity." Id. at 516. But the majority did not reach this question. Beginning with the
assumption that speech is commercial if the advertiser's primary purpose is to make a
profit, the court examined Chrestensen's purpose and was unable to decide whether he
had been primarily engaged in an "advertising plot" or whether he "really believe[d]
in his wrongs." Id. Because the court felt that borderline cases should be resolved in
favor of the cherished right of freedom of speech, it concluded that the handbill was
not commercial and was thus protected. Id. Dissenting, Judge Frank took issue with
both points. He believed constitutional protection should not be accorded commercial
communications merely because they can be subsumed under the rubric of "speech."
To do so, he thought, would be to "'thingify' the words 'free speech' and 'free
expression', and to become forgetful of the vital ideas ... and 'the processes . . .' for
which they stand."Id. at 525 (Frank, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Secondly, in a
somewhat metaphysical discussion, Judge Frank stated that there were in fact two
handbills in issue; he would have determined the primary purpose for each. Because
the purely paper tie was an arbitrary choice of their common author, he felt
Chrestensen was estopped from maintaining that the two handbills were inseparable
for the purpose of "the delicate judicial power of nullifying legislation." Id. at 517.
Accordingly, he would have considered only the commercial side when determining
the author's purpose. Id. at 517-22.
19. 316 U.S. at 54.
20. See Redish, The First Amendment in the Market Place: Commercial Speech
and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 450 (1971). Given the
dissension in the court below, see note 18 supra, it is odd that the Court treated this
subject so superficially. One member of the Chrestensen Court, Justice Douglas, later
remarked that "[t]he ruling was casual, almost off hand." Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring). The decision has been
described as "one of those curious judicial judgments which so often illustrate the
psychology which accompanies war." Gardner, Free Speech in Public Places, 36 B.U.
L. REV. 239, 239 (1956) (footnote omitted).
21. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
22. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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whereas the ordinance before the Breard Court prohibited only the
circulation of commercial solicitations.
Breard was the last case in which the Supreme Court denied first
amendment protection to speech because of its commercial character. 23
Although lower courts continued to apply the "commercial speech excep-
tion," thus denying commercial advertising first amendment protection, 24
some members of the Supreme Court began to recognize the valuable role
commercial speech plays in our society and indicated that it might, to some
extent, be protected by the first amendment. 25
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rela-
tions,26 the Court was called upon to determine whether a newspaper that
carried help-wanted advertisements in sex-designated columns, in violation
of a municipal ordinance, was entitled to first amendment protection. A five
member majority of the Court considered but did not adopt the commission's
argument that the regulation was constitutionally permissible because
commercial speech is unprotected. The Court agreed that the advertisements
before it were classic examples of commercial speech: they were merely
proposals of possible employment and did not express a position on whether,
as a matter of social policy, an employer should be able to use gender as a
factor in deciding who should fill a certain position.27 The Court did not,
however, base its decision to deny first amendment protection upon its
finding that the want-ad display was commercial speech. Rather, it held
that the display was unprotected because the advertisements proposed an
illegal activity: sex-based employment discrimination. 28 Indeed, for the first
time, the Court indicated that there might be a "First Amendment interest
which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and
which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the
regulation .... -29 The Court hinted that in an appropriate situation it
might find commercial advertising to be constitutionally protected. In
Bigelow v. Virginia,30 decided in 1975, the Court was presented with such a
situation.
The defendant in Bigelow was an editor of a Virginia newspaper that
published an advertisement soliciting patrons for an abortion referral
service operating out of New York. He was convicted under a Virginia law
23. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 759 (1976).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211-12 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 934 (1972), and cases cited therein; 1 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN,
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 551-55 (law school ed.) (4th ed.
1976).
25. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 904-06 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting), denying cert. to 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir. 1971).
26. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
27. Id. at 387-88.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 389.
30. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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making it a crime to advertise, encourage, or promote the procuring of an
abortion. Virginia's highest court affirmed, 1 stating that the advertisement
was unprotected because it was commercial speech. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, holding that the ordinance upon which it was based
was unconstitutional because it unduly infringed upon protected expression.
The majority appeared to have based its holding that the advertisement
served first amendment interests upon alternative grounds. First, the Court
disposed of Chrestensen by describing the case as having held only that
commercial advertising is subject to reasonable regulation of its manner of
distribution. 2 The majority implied that commercial speech has always
enjoyed some degree of first amendment protection. 33 Second, the majority
distinguished the advertisement before it from that involved in
Chrestensen. It found the distinguishing feature of the abortion advertise-
ment to be that it contained factual material of public interest.34
Although it can be maintained that the Bigelow Court, by emphasizing
the public interest aspect of the defendant's speech, implied that only
commercial communications which contain factual material of public
interest are protected, it is uncertain what the Court believed the first
amendment interest of the abortion advertisement to be. The Court did,
however, engage in a balancing analysis, concluding that Virginia's interest
did not outweigh the first amendment interest at stake. It observed that the
state's objective was, in effect, to deny its citizens information about
activities outside its borders - an objective which the Court clearly believed
to be impermissible. 35
The Bigelow Court's reliance upon its finding that the advertisement
contained factual material of public interest engendered varying interpreta-
31. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972), rev'd, 421 U.S.
809 (1975). For an analysis of the case in the Virginia courts, see 60 VA. L. REV. 154
(1974).
32. 421 U.S. at 819. Most of the case law and commentary dealing with
commercial speech however, have considered Chrestensen to stand for the proposition
that commercial communications are wholly unprotected by the first amendment. See,
e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211-12 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972).
33. 421 U.S. at 820-21. Justice Blackmun cited Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (see text accompanying notes 26 to
29 supra) and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) as authority for
this assertion. In Pittsburgh Press, however, the Court merely said that commercial
speech might be protected by the first amendment. See text accompanying note 28
supra. Nor does the New York Times case stand for the proposition that commercial
speech enjoys some degree of protection. There, when a newspaper published a full
page advertisement soliciting funds for the committee to defend Martin Luther King,
Jr., the Court's holding that the advertisement was protected was based upon its
finding that it was not commercial speech. Because the advertisement "communicated
information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and
sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives
were matters of the highest public interest and concern," the Court felt that it could be
distinguished from the commercial advertisement before it in Chrestensen. 376 U.S. at
266.
34. 421 U.S. at 822.
35. Id. at 824-25.
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tions of the protection it had afforded commercial speech. Some courts held
that Bigelow demanded a balancing of interests whenever commercial
speech was involved; others interpreted the case as having recognized a
narrow category of unprotected commercial speech reserved for those
communications devoid of factual material of public interest. 36 Because the
Court's public interest analysis could be interpreted to function either as a
means of removing the abortion advertisement from the category of
commercial speech or as a criterion for determining the value of commercial
communications within the context of a first amendment balancing
analysis, the degree of protection which the Bigelow Court extended to
commercial speech was uncertain. In retrospect, it appears that the Bigelow
Court sought to prevent a state's use of the label "commercial speech" to
justify the suppression of valuable information. By rereading Chrestensen to
obliterate the commercial speech exception, the Court accomplished this
objective. Yet the Court's public interest and balancing analyses created the
possibility that a state regulation could constitutionally suppress those
commercial communications that lacked factual material of public interest.
In its very next term the Court resolved this confusion.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 37 a consumer group challenged the constitutionality of a
Virginia statute that prohibited the advertisement of prescription drug
prices by pharmacists. 38 At the outset, a seven member majority of the Court
acknowledged that after Bigelow the "commercial speech exception" might
still retain some validity because the subject matter of the Bigelow
advertisement had not been purely commercial. 39 The majority, therefore,
explicitly stated that the question whether commercial speech is unprotected
was squarely before the Court.40 Speaking for the Court, Justice Blackmun
further defined the issue as being whether "speech which does 'no more than
36. For a list of post Bigelow cases split along these lines, see Comment, First
Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional
Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 218 n.87 (1976).
37. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
38, According to VA. CODE §54-524.35 (1974), a pharmacist was guilty of
unprofessional conduct if he
(3) publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner
whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms
for professional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs
which may be dispensed only by prescription.
Other states have invalidated similar laws. See Florida Bd. of Pharmacy v. Webb's
City, Inc., 219 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1969) (no reasonable relation to public health, safety,
morals or general welfare); Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md.
103, 311 A.2d 242 (1973) (held to violate state and federal due process clauses);
Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487 (1971) (held
to violate state due process standard). But see Supermarkets General Corp. v. Sills, 93
N.J. Super. 326, 225 A.2d 728 (1966); Urowsky v. Board of Regents, 38 N.Y.2d 364, 342
N.E.2d 583, 379 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1975). A federal court has also invalidated a similar
state law. See Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal.
1975), aff'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
39. 425 U.S. at 760.
40. Id. at 760-61.
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propose a commercial transaction,' . . . is so removed from any 'exposition
of ideas,' . . . and from '"truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its
diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,"'.
that it lacks all protection." 4 The Court held that it was not.
Justice Blackmun began his analysis by recognizing that important
individual and societal interests are served by the free flow of commercial
information. He noted that both the advertiser - the pharmacist - and the
public have an interest in maintaining the free flow of drug price infor-
mation. He stated that the pharmacist's interest, although predominantly
economic, deserved consideration. 42 Justice Blackmun observed that the
Court has long recognized that employees and employers engaged in labor
disputes enjoy first amendment rights despite the fact that their interests
are economic rather than political. 43 He believed also that the consumer has
an interest in receiving price information, an interest which he character-
ized as perhaps "keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent
political debate." 44 He reasoned that, to the consumer of prescription drugs,
who is often aged and on a fixed income, 45 knowledge of the varying prices
of medication might make it unnecessary to choose between the alleviation
of physical pain and the enjoyment of basic necessities. 46
Justice Blackmun also suggested that the free flow of commercial
information would serve vital societal interests by facilitating democratic
public decisionmaking. 47 In a free market economy, where the allocation of
resources depends largely upon numerous private economic decisions, the
41. Id. at 762 (citations omitted).
42. Id.
A .Id. (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-18 (1969); NLRB v.
Virginia ' 1-.c. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321,
325-26 (1941,, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
44. Id. at 763.
45. See id. at n.18.
46. Id. at 764. The regulation effectively prevented all comparison shopping for
prescription drugs. The prices of these drugs had been found to vary by as much as
1200% within the same city. Id. at 754 n.11.
A comparison of Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va.
1969), with Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F.
Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), illustrates just how important a
consumer's interest in receiving drug price information can be. In both cases the
regulation ultimately overturned in Virginia Pharmacy was challenged. In Patterson
Drug the district court's holding that the first amendment did not protect commercial
speech seemed to have been influenced by the fact that the plaintiff was a drug
company. When, as in Virginia Citizens, the plaintiffs were consumers, the district
court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional, noting that the plaintiffs' interest
was fundamentally deeper than a trade consideration, 373 F. Supp. at 686. See
generally Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New
Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEO. L.J. 775 (1975); Note, Constitutional Law -
State Statute Prohibiting Pharmacists from Publishing Prescription Drug Prices
Violates Consumers' Right to Know, 23 KAN. L. REV. 289 (1975); Note, Constitutional
Law: The Constitutionality of a Statute Prohibiting Advertising of Prescription Drug
Prices, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 350 (1975).
47. 425 U.S. at 765.
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public interest would be served by the availability of adequate information
enabling citizens to make intelligent economic decisions.48 Justice Blackmun
further maintained that information which is indispensable to the proper
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system is also indispensable to
the development of intelligent opinions as to how that system should be
regulated or altered. 49
Having established that advertising - commercial speech - is within
the scope of the first amendment because it is instrumental in the process of
enlightened public decisionmaking, Justice Blackmun considered and
rejected the asserted justifications for the advertising ban. He acknowledged
that the state had a strong interest in maintaining the professionalism of its
pharmacists. 5° Yet he noted that the state's attempt to regulate the
profession, by prohibiting all advertising of prescription drugs, was a
suppression of commercial information.5 1 Under the close inspection
required when evaluating laws which suppress expression, he found that the
advertising ban did not directly affect professional standards one way or
another.5 2 Apparently because the state's means did not substantially
further its objective, the Court concluded that the first amendment
mandated the protection of the information which the State of Virginia
sought to suppress.
53
48. Id.
49. Id. The Court indicated that even advertisements that appear to contain no
material of public interest should be protected. Thus, the Court conclusively decided
that the public interest criterion should not be utilized when determining the first
amendment protection afforded particular advertisements. Id. Perhaps the Court
abandoned the public interest criterion because of the difficulties which that standard
produced when it was applied in libel cases decided after the Court's landmark
decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See, e.g., Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("all human
events are arguably within the area of 'public or general concern' "). Indeed, shortly
after the Bigelow decision, one commentator prophetically suggested that "subjective
analysis [of the public interest content of advertisements] will be avoided by declaring
all but intentionally deceptive advertising to be of public interest .... The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 47, 117 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
If protection were commensurate with the public interest value of an
advertisement, a court would scrutinize the content of each communication to
determine the appropriate degree of protection. Yet, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out
in his dissent to Bigelow, the Court believes it is improper to make first amendment
decisions on the basis of the content of the speech. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,
831 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
50. 425 U.S. at 766.
51. Id. at 769-70.
52. Id. at 769.
53. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, objected to the majority's analysis, insisting
that the Virginia Legislature is charged with the regulation of that state's
pharmacists, 425 U.S. at 783 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and that the free enterprise
system presupposed by the majority is not required by the Constitution. Id. at 784
("[T]here is certainly nothing in the United States Constitution which requires the
Virginia Legislature to hew to the teachings of Adam Smith ...."). These words
echo Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s attack on substantive due process in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the Fourteenth
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The decision in Virginia Pharmacy, however, was not without its
caveats. The Court noted that certain "common sense differences" between
commercial and other varieties of speech might suggest that a different
degree of protection be accorded commercial communications5 4 Because
commercial speech is the sine qua non of commercial profits, and thus
extremely durable, and because it is also particularly susceptible to
verification by its disseminator, it may be less necessary to tolerate
inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker.55 Furthermore, it
may be appropriate to require additional messages, warnings, or disclaimers
so as to prevent deception. 56 In addition, the general prohibition against
prior restraints may not apply. 57 The Court also cautioned that only truthful
commercial speech is protected; a state is free to suppress false and
misleading advertisements.58 Finally, the Virginia Pharmacy Court warned
that it had considered only product advertising and that advertising of
professional services might require special consideration. 59 Indeed, in his
concurring opinion Chief Justice Burger stated that advertisements for
professional services could be inherently deceptive, because professional
judgment, a factor which can not be readily measured, is the subject of the
transaction. 60 Accordingly, he would uphold a regulation that suppressed
advertising by professionals.
Despite these substantial qualifications, the Virginia Pharmacy opinion
made it clear that the Court is not likely to tolerate a regulation that
suppresses commercial speech. The opinion contained language which
makes it difficult to determine whether the Court will utilize an exacting
scrutiny6' or a categorization test 62 when evaluating legislation that
suppresses commercial advertising. Justice Blackmun appeared to apply an
exacting scrutiny analysis,63 yet, he also stated: "It is precisely this kind of
choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics ... [a] constitution is
not intended to embody a particular economic theory.") See also Note, Purely
Commercial Speech and Its Relationship to the First Amendment, 37 LA. L. REV. 263,
267-70 (1976).
54. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 770-72. Justice Blackmun also noted that ordinances which suppress
advertisements proposing illegal activities and time, place, and manner restrictions
that are enacted without regard to content would be constitutional. Id. Additionally,
the Justice hinted that commercial speech that is disseminated through the electronic
media might receive less protection. Id. at 773.
59. Id. at n.25. But cf. Morrison, Institute on Advertising Within the Legal
Profession - Pro, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 609, 614-15 (1976) (suggesting that the Virginia
Pharmacy majority knew that the logical development of its decision would be an
invalidation of bans on attorney advertising).
60. 425 U.S. at 774-75 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
61. See note 6 supra.
62. See text accompanying notes 6 to 10 supra.
63. See text accompanying notes 50 to 53 supra. See also The Supreme Court, 1975
Term, 90 HAaV. L. REv. 56, 145-47 (1976).
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its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us."6 4
This language appears to state the categorization test. Although the former
approach makes the suppression of protected speech theoretically possible, it
is doubtful that the Court would ever uphold such a regulation. The Court's
discussion of the common sense differences of commercial speech does,
however, indicate that commercial speech will be given unique treatment
when it is the subject of a regulation not related to the suppression of
information.6 5
Further support for this analysis is found in Linmark Associates Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro.6s In that case, a community attempted to prohibit
64. 425 U.S. at 770.
65. It is unclear, however, how much protection will be accorded commercial
speech when it is being regulated by a content-neutral time, place, or manner
ordinance. Perhaps in this situation the common sense differences between
advertising and other speech, which suggest that it receives a different degree of
protection, will allow the state greater leeway in regulating commercial communica-
tions. Consider, for example, the recent New York case of People v. Remeny, 40 N.Y.2d
527, 355 N.E.2d 375, 387 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1976).
In Remeny, the defendant was arrested for distributing handbills for a jazz
concert under an ordinance prohibiting all commercial handbilling inside the New
York City limits. The court, in a plurality opinion, cited Virginia Pharmacy as having
held that advertising enjoyed first amendment protection. Although the court
admitted that commercial speech may be reasonably regulated, it concluded that the
ordinance was an unconstitutional regulation of commercial speech because it
prohibited the distribution of all advertising handbills.
The court appears to have found that the regulation suppressed speech. Yet,
because the city had not sought to prohibit people from acting upon the ideas
communicated by the advertising handbills, but had attempted only to prevent
littering - a content-neutral objective - the city ordinance was, at least arguably, not
a suppression but a time, place, or manner restriction. As such, the court should have
weighed the city's interest against the first amendment interest of the defendant to
determine the constitutionality of the regulation.
Moreover, although the court was correct when it stated that an absolute
prohibition of political or religious handbilling would not be a reasonable time, place,
and manner regulation, the same ordinance when applied to commercial speech might
well be constitutional. In balancing the interests at stake a court should consider one
of the "common sense differences" of commercial speech: its durability. Because
advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, it is unlikely to be chilled by a
regulation of this nature. In fact, commercial enterprises have survived in New York
City for years under this ordinance. Because there are alternative channels for
disseminating this information and because the city's interests in preventing littering
and traffic congestion are so strong, it is likely this ordinance would be considered
constitutional. See also Developments in the Law - Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV.
L. Rav. 1005, 1035 (1967), noting that because commercial advertising creates
increased revenues an advertiser is more able to afford newspaper and broadcast
media outlets than is a political or religious speaker.
Indeed, in a dissenting opinion in Remeny, Judge Jasen stated that the court
should have engaged in a balancing approach. He felt that because commercial
speech may occupy a lower position on the scale of first amendment values it may be
susceptible to especially keen regulation. Taking cognizance of the "crushing
financial plight of the central cities," he would have upheld the regulation. 40 N.Y.2d
at 542, 355 N.E.2d at 385, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 424 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
66. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
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the posting of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs on the lawns of its citizens' homes,
thereby effecting a suppression of information. 67 The Township sought to
justify the ban by claiming that its goal was to promote stable, racially
integrated housing. 68 While the Court acknowledged the importance of this
goal, it noted that the Township had failed to establish that its ordinance
was essential to the maintenance of Willingboro's status as an integrated
community.6 9 Moreover, the Court indicated that even if Willingboro had
demonstrated this connection, the regulation would still be unconstitutional.
Thus, Justice Marshall, the Court's spokesman in Willingboro, seemed to
believe that Virginia Pharmacy mandated the application of the categoriza-
tion test. He said, "[trhe constitutional defect in this ordinance, however, is
far more basic. The Township . . acted to prevent its residents from
obtaining certain information .... Virginia Pharmacy Bd. denies govern-
ment such sweeping powers."70
It was against this backdrop that the state of Arizona sought to justify
its regulation which effectively suppressed all advertising by attorneys.
THE Bates CASE
On February 22, 1976, John Bates and Van O'Steen, members of the
Arizona State Bar, placed an advertisement 7' in The Arizona Republic, a
daily newspaper, offering their legal services and setting forth their prices
for performing the legal work necessary for name changes, uncontested
personal bankruptcies, uncontested adoptions, and uncontested divorces.
The advertisement violated Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) of the Arizona
Supreme Court,7 2 which prohibited lawyer advertising. The president of the
state bar filed a complaint with a special administrative committee and a
67. The township has not prohibited all lawn signs - or all lawn signs of a
particular size and shape - in order to promote aesthetic values or any other
value 'unrelated to the suppression of free expression,' . . . . Rather,
Willingboro has proscribed particular types of signs based on their content
because it fears their 'primary' effect - that they will cause those receiving
the information to act upon it.
Id. at 93-94 (footnotes omitted). In the decision below, the Third Circuit mistakenly
characterized the ordinance as a time, place, or manner regulation. Linmark Assoc. v.
Town of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 795 (3d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). Due to
this finding and the court's belief that commercial speech should receive less than full
protection, id. at 797, it upheld the ordinance. In a perspicacious dissent, however,
Judge Gibbons pointed out that the regulation did in fact present a content-directed
suppression of information. Id. at 813-15 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
68. 431 U.S. at 94.
69. Id. at 95-96.
70. Id. at 96-97.
71. A copy of the advertisement can be found at the end of this Comment.
72. ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 29(a), DR 2-101(B) (Supp. 1977-78), which provided in part:
(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or
magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display
advertisements in the city or telephone directories or other means of
commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his
behalf.
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hearing was held. The committee recommended that Bates and O'Steen be
suspended from the practice of law for not less than six months. Upon
review by the board of governors of the state bar, the penalty was modified
to a one-week suspension.73
The attorneys appealed to the Supreme Court of Arizona, 74 arguing that
the disciplinary rule violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, 75 the first and fourteenth amendments 76 to the United States
Constitution, and should be declared void for vagueness. A majority of the
court rejected these arguments, concluding that the rule had been violated
and that neither the Constitution nor the Sherman Act precluded its
enforcement.7 7 Despite this agreement as to the result, no majority opinion
was written. Two of the five justices concurred in a plurality opinion,
affirming the constitutionality of the rule but reducing the penalty to
censure because they concluded that the advertisement had been placed
with a good faith intention to test the constitutionality of the rule. 78 One
justice concurred with the plurality's result and basically agreed with its
analysis, but felt compelled to express his fear that attorney advertisements
that included prices or statements about the quality of the legal services
73. See Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2695 (1977).
74. In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (Supp. IV 1974). Section 1 of the act declares, with certain
exceptions, that "[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations," is illegal. Section 2 states that "[e]very person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall" incur a stated penalty.
76. Bates and O'Steen maintained that the rule violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment because it permitted advertising by qualified
legal services organizations but prohibited any other attorney advertising. In re
Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 399, 555 P.2d 640, 645 (1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977). Cf. id. at 403-04, 555 P.2d at 649-50
(Holohan, J., dissenting) (rule discriminates between advertising in a law directory
and advertising in traditional print media). They also alleged that they had been
denied due process by both the special administrative committee and the Board of
Governors because the members of these bodies, being lawyers, had a pecuniary
interest in the outcome. Id. at 400, 555 P.2d at 646.
77. See In Re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
sub. nom. Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977). The plurality, citing Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), see note 82 infra, concluded that the Arizona Supreme
Court's regulation of the state bar was an act of the state in its capacity as sovereign
and, therefore, not within the coverage of the Sherman Act. 113 Ariz. at 396-97, 555
P.2d at 642-43. In rejecting the first amendment claim, the plurality observed that
restrictions on professional advertising had withstood constitutional challenge in the
past, and that those cases in which commercial speech had been afforded first
amendment protection could be read to deny protection to advertisements for
professional services. Id. at 397-99, 555 P.2d at 643-45. See also Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 n.25 (1976)
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
78. 113 Ariz. at 400, 555 P.2d at 646.
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offered might mislead or deceive the public.7 9 A fourth justice, although
agreeing with the plurality's analysis, dissented, finding the penalty the
court imposed too lenient. The fifth justice dissented, concluding that the
advertisements were speech protected by the first amendment.80 Bates and
O'Steen appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
In an opinion 8s discussing only the antitrust and first amendment
claims, the Supreme Court found Bates' and O'Steen's Sherman Act
objection barred by the state action exception of Parker v. Brown,8 2 but held
that the prohibition against attorney advertising violated the first
79. Id. at 401-02, 555 P.2d at 647-48.
80. Id. at 402-04, 555 P.2d at 648-50.
81. Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
82. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), a raisin producer-packer challenged a
state raisin marketing program that had been designed to maintain market prices by
restricting competition among growers. The Court held that the state "as sovereign,
imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not
undertake to prohibit." Id. at 352. Parker, however, has been limited by the recent
cases of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), and Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
In Goldfarb, the Court held that a state bar's enforcement of a minimum fee
schedule published by a county bar violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. Although the bar
associations argued that they fell within the Parker exemption, the Court concluded
that the action was not protected because the state did not require such anti-
competitive activities. 421 U.S. at 790-92. The Bates Court noted that DR 2-101(B)
was, by contrast, an affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court. Because the
state had invested that court with the power to regulate the legal profession, the
restraint was compelled by the state acting as a sovereign and was thereby within the
Parker exemption. 97 S. Ct. at 2696-98.
In Cantor, the question whether an action had been mandated by the state of
Michigan was more problematic. There, a retailer of electric light bulbs claimed that a
private utility which distributed free light bulbs to its residential consumers was
using its monopoly power in the distribution of electricity to restrain competition in
the sale of light bulbs. The Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred
upon the utility because the state had merely authorized and had not required the
utility to adopt the program. 428 U.S. at 592-98. Bates and O'Steen, attempting to
draw an analogy, argued that DR 2-101(B) should not acquire Sherman Act
immunity simply because it had been accepted by the state. Moreover, they
maintained that the interest in free competition embodied in the Sherman Act should
prevail over the interest in regulating advertising, especially in view of the fact that
the advertising ban had not been narrowly drawn. 97 S. Ct. at 2697.
In rejecting the appellants' contentions, the Court distinguished Bates by
citing the context in which Cantor arose. The defendant in that case was a private
party. If it had been a state official or agency, the result might have been different. 97
S. Ct. at 2697. In Bates, however, the appellants' claims were directed against the
state itself. Moreover, unlike Cantor, regulation of a bar's activities is at the core of a
state's power to protect its citizens. Federal interference with a state's regulation of a
profession is entirely unlike the intrusion that the Court sanctioned in Cantor. 97 S.
Ct. at 2697-98. Finally, the Bates Court noted that because the disciplinary rules were
created and enforced by the Arizona Supreme Court, the "concern that federal policy
is being unnecessarily and inappropriately subordinated to state policy is reduced.
• . ." Id. See generally Note, Advertising and the Legal Profession: An Analysis of the
Requirements of the Sherman Act and the First Amendment, 6 U.C.L.A. - ALAs. L.
REV. 67, 67-82 (1976); Note, Sherman Act Scrutiny of Bar Restraints on Advertising
19771
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amendment guarantee of freedom of speech.8 3 Justice Blackmun, speaking
for the majority, reasoned that the constitutional principles which the Court
had cited in recent cases as supporting the extension of first amendment
protection to product advertising compelled the Court to grant similar
protection to attorney advertising.84
The Arizona Bar contended in Bates that its Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B)
differed sufficiently from the ordinances overturned in previous commercial
speech cases to survive a first amendment challenge. The rule, which
prohibited any advertisement or announcement in newspapers or maga-
zines, or on radio or television, publicizing a lawyer, his partner or his
firm,8 5 undeniably was a suppression of speech. Yet the Bar argued that the
strong governmental interests that had traditionally been served by
regulating advertising by professionals compelled a finding in its favor.86
Justice Blackmun, representing the majority of five Justices, began his
analysis by carefully narrowing the issue before the Court. He noted that the
Court was not dealing with advertisements concerning the quality of
legal services: claims going to the quality of a lawyer's work appear less
likely to receive protection as they "are not susceptible to precise
measurement or verification and, under some circumstances, might well be
deceptive or misleading to the public, or even false. 8s7 Nor were the special
problems attending the in-person solicitation of clients before the Court.
That type of solicitation might also remain unprotected because it involves
"dangers of overreaching and misrepresentation."88 Rather, the precise issue
presented in the Bates case concerned the constitutionality of prohibiting
attorneys from advertising, in newspapers, the prices for which routine
services would be performed.8 9
The Arizona Bar presented six arguments supporting its prohibition
against attorney advertising. First, it asserted that attorney advertising
would commercialize the legal profession. The Bar was fearful that
and Solicitation by Attorneys, 62 VA. L. REV. 1135 (1976); Note, Price Advertising of
Legal Services: The Move Towards a Balancing Test, 16 WASHBURN L. REV. 683,
683-701 (1977).
83. 97 S. Ct. at 2698-2709.
84. Id. at 2700.
85. See note 72 supra.
86. In three previous cases, the Supreme Court had upheld the right of a state to
regulate advertising by professionals in the health services field. None of these cases,
however, had been decided on first amendment grounds. See Head v. New Mexico Bd.
of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963) (New Mexico's ban of advertising by optometrists
applied against Texas optometrists whose radio broadcast reached New Mexico;
upheld against charge that it burdened interstate commerce); Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (statute banning solicitation for sales of
eyeglasses upheld against due process challenge); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of
Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (statute providing for revocation of the license
of any dentist who advertised upheld against due process, equal protection, and
contract clause challenges).
87. 97 S. Ct. at 2700.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2709.
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commercialization would undermine an attorney's sense of dignity and self-
worth, adversely affect the service orientation of the profession, damage the
delicate balance between the lawyer's need to earn and his obligation
selflessly to serve, and, because the client would find his attorney to be
profit-motivated, erode the client's trust in his attorney.10 The Bates
majority, however, found the "connection between advertising and the
erosion of true professionalism to be severely strained." 91 Similarly, it
rejected the Bar's related contention that the profit motive revealed by
advertising would be detrimental to the attorney-client relationship. The
Court pointed out that clients certainly realize that their attorneys earn a
living by rendering their services. It noted that the American Bar
Association itself recommends that an attorney and his client agree upon a
fee schedule as soon as the attorney has been employed.9 2 Moreover, the
Court cited studies which indicated that increasing public disillusionment
with the legal profession might stem from the failure of lawyers to publicize
their services and fees.93 The majority suggested that the availability of this
information would serve the best interests of the profession.9 4
In a second argument supporting its rule, the Bar warned of an
undesirable economic effect of attorney advertising: advertising would result
in increased overhead costs which would in turn be passed on to the
consumer.95 Justice Blackmun responded that this argument was no
different from that advanced in Virginia Pharmacy, and that it was not
"relevant to the First Amendment. '96 Moreover, in citing studies that show
that prices decrease when product advertisements are undertaken, 97 the
90. Id. at 2701.
91. Id. at 2709.
92. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-19 (1976).
93. 97 S. Ct. at 2702. See also M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 115-16 (1975); Branca & Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules and Legal
Advertising: The Implications of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 475, 516-17 (1977).
Moreover, there is evidence that the public believes that lawyers charge more for their
services than they are worth. See B. CURRAN & F. SPALDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF
THE PUBLIC 96 (1974) (33.7% of sample strongly agree that lawyers charge too much,
28.3% agree slightly, 10.2% strongly disagree). This perception may or may not be
based upon experience, because the above sample involved both users and non-users
of legal services. Id. at 36.
94. 97 S. Ct. at 2702-03.
95. Id. at 2705. The Bar also suggested that advertising would create an entry
barrier for young attorneys because advertising expenditures would increase the cost
of practice and, thereby, prevent them from setting up their own practice. The Court,
however, thought that, absent advertising, an attorney must rely on contacts in the
community to generate a flow of business. Since these contacts develop only over
time, the Court felt the ban actually favors the entrenched members of the profession.
Id. at 2705-06.
96. Id. at 2706.
97. Id. at 2706 n.34. The Court cited Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the
Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. L. & ECON. 337 (1972). The study found the prices of
eyeglasses lower in cities allowing advertising than in cities prohibiting advertising.
Benham noted that there is no firm theoretical basis for predicting whether
advertising will raise or lower prices. It is said that prices of advertised products will
1977]
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Justice noted that attorney advertising might reduce the cost of legal
services. 98
In a third argument, the Bar emphasized the difficulties involved in
policing the community of advertising lawyers. The Bar felt that the close
scrutiny necessary for proper regulation would be impossible. The Court
replied that it is likely that only a few of the many attorneys who will
advertise will take unscrupulous advantage of the situation, and that it
would be in the best interest of the Bar to weed out those who do. 99
In two other arguments, the Bar asserted that advertising would have
the undesirable effects of stirring up or encouraging litigation '00 and of
adversely affecting the quality of legal services rendered.101 The Court noted,
however, that it has traditionally favored facilitating access to legal
services.'0 2 While it admitted that advertising might ultimately increase the
case load of the courts, the Court felt that, in principle, it is not improper to
litigate an actionable wrong.10 3 Responding to the quality argument, the
Court simply rejected the notion that advertising will induce lawyers to
provide substandard services, stating "[a]n attorney who is inclined to cut
quality will do so regardless of the rule on advertising."'' 0 4
A final argument, and the Bar's strongest point supporting a distinction
between its disciplinary rule and the regulations invalidated in other
commercial speech cases, was the claim that attorney advertising inescapa-
bly will be misleading.10 5 The Bar felt that attorney advertising would be
inherently misleading because legal services are so individualized with
regard to content and quality that a consumer could not make an intelligent
be higher because consumers will pay for the persuasive aspects of advertising, and
for its product differentiation effects. Advertising of goods can, however, economize
the consumer's search, increase the probability of locating low-priced sellers, and
lower the prices of manufacturers due to an ability to utilize economies of scale. Id.
98. 97 S. Ct. at 2706.
99. Id. at 2707. Justice Blackmun thought it incongruous that the Bar would extol
the virtues of the profession when discussing the effect advertising would have on
professionalism but later assert that its members would seize this opportunity to
mislead. Id.
100. Id. at 2704.
101. Id. at 2706.
102. Id. at 2705 n.32 (citing United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585
(1971); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222-24 (1967);
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-40 (1963)).
103. 97 S. Ct. at 2705.
104. Id. at 2706.
105. This argument is strongest not because it is most deeply rooted in empirical
fact but due to its constitutional significance. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Because commercial speech is protected, a regulation that suppresses
truthful advertising will be subject, at a minimum, to exacting scrutiny by the Court.
Advertising which is deceptive or misleading, however, remains unprotected. A state
will not encounter a first amendment problem when it attempts to regulate this type
of commercial speech. See id. at 770-71.
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comparison of attorneys solely on the basis of an advertisement. 10 6 The Bar
also suggested that attorney advertising would be misleading because it
would tend to emphasize "irrelevant factors" rather than the relevant factor
of skill. 10
7
Justice Blackmun agreed that some attorney services were unique and
noted that "it is doubtful that any attorney would or could advertise fixed
prices for services of that type."'10 8 He stated, however, that there were other
"routine" services such as "the uncontested divorce, the simple adoption, the
uncontested personal bankruptcy, the change of name, and the like"' 10 9
which would not be misleading if advertised, provided the lawyer does the
required work at the specified price. Moreover, he cited the State Bar of
Arizona's Legal Services Program, under which attorneys agree to perform
such services at standardized rates, as evidencing the feasibility of this
approach.110
The Court recognized that attorney advertisements have the potential to
deceive, but said that the remedy lay in providing more information, not
less. Specifically, the majority noted that the Bar is authorized to require
that certain services be included in an advertised package. 1 ' The majority
felt that it is the Bar's responsibility to educate the public: if consumers are
better informed of the work included within advertised legal services, the
likelihood of deception or misunderstanding would decrease." 12
Not every member of the Court, however, thought the routine-unique
dichotomy could mitigate the problem of deception presented by attorney
advertising. In a dissenting opinion, with which Justice Stewart concurred,
Justice Powell concluded that professional advertising differed from product
advertising in two important respects: professional advertising has an
enhanced potential for deception, and it is not amenable to effective
regulation in the public interest." 3 In his discussion of the deception point,
Justice Powell concluded that the majority's distinction between routine and
unique services was unsatisfactory. He pointed out that the majority left the
categories largely undefined and noted the relative nature of "routine
services."'' 4 He observed that a marital trust provision of a will might well
be routine for an experienced tax and estate lawyer, but would be quite
another matter for an attorney who specializes in negligence. Moreover,
Justice Powell thought that price advertising of even the services listed in
the Bates advertisement inevitably would mislead because the consumer
106. 97 S. Ct. at 2703.
107. Id.
108. Id. (footnote omitted).
109. Id.
110. Id. The Court noted that the Maricopa County Bar had also utilized a
minimum fee schedule until the decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975). See Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90
HARV. L. REV. 702, 714 (1977).
111. 97 S. Ct. at 2703 n.28.
112. Id. at 2704.
113. 97 S. Ct. at 2713 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
114. Id. at 2713-14.
1977]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
and the attorney usually do not know in advance the extent of the services
which a legal problem might require. 115 For example, does the fee for an
uncontested divorce include alimony, support and maintenance for children,
child custody, visitation rights, interest in life insurance, community
property, tax refunds, or tax liability." 6 Justice Powell was of the opinion
that the average lay person would have no knowledge of the services
included or excluded from the package divorce and, consequently, would be
misled by an advertisement fixing a single price for the entire transaction."17
Regarding what he perceived as the other major difference between
professional and product advertising - the difficulties of effective regula-
tion - Justice Powell accused the Court of seriously understating the
problems which will arise when the state seeks to regulate attorney
advertising. He cited the large number of attorneys and the impossibility of
empirically verifying certain claims"18 as aggravating factors. Because
questions such as what services are routine, can the services be described
accurately and understandably, and what fees are reasonable, do not admit
of truthful "answers," Justice Powell thought effective regulation "could
prove to be a wholly intractable problem." 1 9
Having rejected all the arguments supporting the ban, the Court, in the
usual first amendment case, would have declared the rule unconstitutional
because of its overbreadth. 20 Justice Blackmun, however, declined to apply
the overbreadth doctrine to this case because it involved commercial rather
than political speech. He believed that the rationale underlying the
application of the overbreadth doctrine did not apply to cases involving
professional advertising.' 2' Instead, the Court evaluated the Bates advertise-
115. Id. at 2714.
116. Id. at 2713-14.
117. Id. at 2714.
118. Id. at 2715. But cf. Consumers Union v. ABA, 427 F. Supp. 506, 519 (E.D. Va.
1976), vacated sub nom. Consumers Union v. Virginia State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2993 (1977)
(expert witnesses testified that it would be easier to enforce rules regarding deceptive
advertising against published statements rather than against those made in the
privacy of an office).
119. 97 S. Ct. at 2716 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
120. Indeed, where the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia was faced with a similar problem, it declared DR 2-102(A)(6) of the Virginia
Code of Professional Responsibility (found at 215 Va. 859 (1975)) an unconstitutional-
ly overbroad infringement on first amendment rights. See Consumers Union v. ABA,
427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated sub nom. Consumers Union v. Virginia
State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2993 (1977). In that case, state and national consumer groups sued
the American Bar Association, the State Bar of Virginia, and others claiming that
they had a first amendment right to publish a directory containing selected
information including fees for certain services. The district court believed that it
followed from the Virginia Pharmacy decision that a state rule prohibiting
advertising of material which is not inherently deceptive would be unconstitutional.
Id. at 521. Because the court concluded that both non-fee information and fee
information for standardized and adequately specified tasks would not be inherently
misleading if advertised, it concluded that the ban was an overbroad prohibition. Id.
at 522-23.
121. 97 S. Ct. at 2707-08. Overbreadth is an exception to traditional rules of
standing. Ordinarily, a defendant may successfully challenge the constitutionality of
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ment and found that it could not have been suppressed by even the most
narrowly drawn statute.122
The result reached by the Bates Court is entirely consistent with the
rationale underlying the recent extension of first amendment protection to
commercial speech. Indeed, Justice Blackmun stated that the result might be
said to flow "a fortiori" from the Virginia Pharmacy decision. 123 Once the
Court concluded that advertisements for attorneys' services would not be
inherently misleading, it was unlikely that the Bar could muster the strong
showing necessary to justify a suppression of information. Thus, in Bates,
the Court applied an exacting scrutiny analysis, and found that the
relationship between the state's purpose and the means chosen to achieve
that purpose was not close enough to justify the suppression of attorney
advertising. 124 Although one cannot criticize the Bates Court for properly
extending the reasoning underlying the Virginia Pharmacy decision, it is
less clear that the reasoning in that seminal case is equally immune to
criticism. In his effort to justify the new protection he sought for commercial
speech, Justice Blackmun maintained in Virginia Pharmacy, that because
advertising is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free
enterprise economy, it is also indispensable to the formulation of intelligent
opinions regarding the governing of that system. 25 By this analysis, he
a regulation only when his conduct is itself constitutionally protected. Under the
overbreadth doctrine, one whose conduct properly may be proscribed by a more
narrowly drawn statute is given standing to claim that the regulation is overbroad
with respect to hypothetical defendants whose constitutionally protected expression
would be punished under the statute. The successful overbreadth challenge results in
the invalidation of the entire statute rather than a declaration that it is unconstitu-
tional as applied in a particular case.
The overbreadth doctrine is grounded in the Court's fear that a speaker might
remain silent because of his uncertainty that his first amendment rights would not
prevail when challenged. Overbreadth is used where the Court feels "the possible
harm to society from allowing unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by
the possibility that protected speech will be muted." 97 S. Ct. at 2707. For an appraisal
of how overbreadth has fared under the Burger Court, see Note, Overbreadth Review
and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 532 (1974). See generally Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
The Bates Court, however, felt that the common sense differences of
commercial speech - its durability and objectivity - render overbreadth analysis
inapplicable. Although it held specifically that overbreadth did not apply to
professional advertising, it is very likely that the Court will alsd refuse to apply
overbreadth to product advertising because that speech is more easily verified than is
services advertising.
122. 97 S. Ct. at 2708.
123. Id. at 2700. In fact, in his dissent to Virginia Pharmacy Justice Rehnquist
stated, "I cannot distinguish between the public's right to know the price of drugs and
its right to know the price of title searches or physical examinations or other
professional services for which standardized fees are charged." 425 U.S. at 785
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
124. Unlike Virginia Pharmacy, see text accompanying notes 61 to 64 supra, the
Bates decision contained no language which would suggest that a categorization test
was applied. This suggests that Justice Blackmun has concluded that exacting
scrutiny is the proper test for regulations suppressing commercial speech.
125. 425 U.S. at 765 n.19.
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sought to show that commercial speech was necessary for enlightened public
decision making in our democratic state. This is the criterion which
Alexander Meiklejohn, a leading first amendment theorist whose ideas are
favored by the Court,126 suggests should determine the scope of first
amendment protection.
Yet Meiklejohn might well reject Justice Blackmun's analysis. Meikle-
john believes that the first amendment protects speech that is necessary for
the proper operation of self-government, and not the right to speak per se.
When people speak as voters, lawmakers, or rulers, even as philosophers and
scientists, they are speaking as the governors of their nation, and their
speech should be absolutely protected. But, when they speak as private
individuals, their "private rights, including the right of 'private speech,'"
should receive only due process protection. 127 Commercial speech, it seems,
could be considered either "private" or "public" discourse, but because of its
intimate connection with commercial activity inclines toward the former.
Indeed, Meiklejohn has said, "The Constitutional status of a merchant
advertising his wares . . .is utterly different from that of a citizen who is
planning for the general welfare."'128 A similar conclusion was reached by
another leading first amendment scholar, Professor Thomas Emerson. He
has noted that "[c]ommunications in connection with commercial transac-
tions generally relate to a separate sector of social activity involving the
system of property rights rather than free expression."' 12 9
Putting these theoretical difficulties aside, however, it appears that the
decision to extend first amendment protection to attorney advertisements
almost certainly will yield some salutary results. A survey, commissioned by
the American Bar Association, concluded that the seventy percent of the
American public too poor to afford counsel but not poor enough to receive
legal aid does not receive adequate legal assistance. 3° The underutilization
of legal services by this group has been attributed to their inability to locate
a suitable attorney, and their fear, often unfounded, of prohibitively high
prices.' Price advertising by attorneys should go a long way towards
alleviating this very disturbing problem. Also, the prohibition against
lawyer advertising has led to criticism and perhaps even mistrust of the
profession. 32 One commentator has stated that the advertising ban was
created not to protect the public but to protect lawyers from the revenue-
126. See id.; A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 78-83 (1948). See also Kalven,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
127. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 126, at 35-36, 80.
128. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 39
(1948).
129. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 948 n.93 (1963). See generally Developments in the Law - Deceptive Advertising,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1027-29 (1967).
130. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REVISED HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL
SERVICES 2 (1972).
131. See 97 S. Ct. at 2702 nn.22 & 23 and sources cited therein.
132. See note 93 supra.
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diminishing effects of competition.' 33 Truthful, nondeceptive price advertis-
ing by attorneys is likely to increase the public's confidence in the profession
by showing that lawyers are more concerned with the delivery of their
services than with preventing competition within the profession.
Finally, the economic ramifications of the Bates decision may also be
positive. Although no study of the effects of attorney advertising has ever
been completed,13 4 there is some empirical evidence suggesting that product
advertising tends to lower prices. 35 It is quite possible that the price of
legal services will undergo a similar reduction. Yet, even if consumers
pay less for legal services it does not follow that attorneys will earn less.
Indeed, one commentator recommended advertising as a means of
protecting the bar from a diminution of revenues.' 36 Citing the tremendous
increase in the number of practicing attorneys, he suggested that
advertising will supply the larger market necessary to support the swollen
bar. While this argument is plausible it is unlikely that it has done much to
assuage the fears of practicing attorneys, for the reaction of many lawyers,
and in particular of the ABA, has been to narrowly construe the profession's
new right to advertise.
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S RESPONSE TO
THE Bates DECISION
The Board of Governors of the ABA established a task force on lawyer
advertising shortly before the Bates decision was rendered. 137 Responding to
the Supreme Court's directive in Bates that the bar assure the free and clean
flow of attorney advertising,' 38 the task force drafted two proposals for
amendments to Canon 2 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility.
1 39
These proposals were widely circulated and were the subject of a public
hearing at which lawyer, media, and consumer representatives testified.
40
133. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 114-15 (1975). See
Jacksonville Bar Ass'n v. Wilson, 102 So. 2d 292, 295 (Fla. 1958) ("Of course,
competition is at the root of abuses in advertising."). See generally Morgan, The
Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 704 (1977)
(Professor Morgan's thesis is that the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility is
"consistently self-serving"); J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976).
134. Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. at 2710 n.1 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
135. See note 97 supra. See also Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the
Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1205-07 &
nn.160 & 161 (1972).
136. See Frierson, Legal Advertising, 2 BARRISTER 6, 8 (1975). Cf. B. CHRISTENSEN,
LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 20-22 (1970) (demand for services
probably elastic as was demonstrated by legal aid experience where demand soon
outstripped supply). But cf. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 716 n.51 (demand for legal services relatively
inelastic, simple advertising would not increase use of attorneys).
137. See 46 U.S.L.W. 2089 (Aug. 23, 1977).
138. 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
139. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility Amendments, 46 U.S.L.W. 1 (Aug.
23, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Amendments].
140. Id.
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Ultimately, the House of Delegates of the ABA adopted the more restrictive
of the two sets of amendments.141 The adopted amendments were designed
to ensure that attorney advertising would facilitate the intelligent selection
of counsel by providing accurate, relevant, and truthful information to the
consumer of legal services.1 42 The heart of these amendments, DR 2-101(A)
and (B),1 43 specify the permissible content of an advertisement, the media
through which it may be disseminated, and the manner in which it may be
presented. DR 2-101(A) prohibits, in general terms, public communication of
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statements
or claims. Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B)(1) to (25) delineates the categories of
information which a lawyer may publish, including biographical state-
ments, certain fee information, client references, and the availability and
terms of credit arrangements. Although it is conceded that it is constitution-
ally permissible to regulate both the content of an advertisement which is
141. 46 U.S.L.W. 2089 (Aug. 23, 1977). One proposed set, A, was deemed regulatory
- it authorized lawyers to advertise only certain specified information - whereas
proposal B was deemed directive - it allowed the publication of all information which
is not false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive. Id. at 2. Proposal A was adopted.
142. See, e.g., Amendments, supra note 139, at 4 (EC 2-9).
143. Amendments, supra note 139, at 5. DR 2-101 provides in part:
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in the use
of any form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim.
(B) In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by
potential consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast,
subject to DR 2-103, the following information in print media distributed or
over radio broadcasted in the geographic area or areas in which the lawyer
resides or maintains offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's
clientele resides, provided that the information disclosed by the lawyer in
such publication or broadcast complies with DR 2-101(A), and is presented in
a dignified manner:
(1) Name, including name of law firm and names of profession-
al associates; addresses and telephone numbers;
(2) One or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm
practices, a statement that practice is limited to one or more fields of
law, or a statement that the lawyer or law firm specializes in a
particular field of law practice, to the extent authorized under DR
2-105;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal
courts;
(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees and
other scholastic distinctions;
(6) Public or quasi-public offices;
(7) Military service;
(8) Legal authorships;
(9) Legal teaching positions;
(10) Memberships, offices, and committee assignments, in bar
associations;
(11) Membership and offices in legal fraternities and legal
societies;
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deceptive, fraudulent, misleading, or which proposes an illegal transac-
tion,'4 4 and the time, place, and manner of an advertisement, it is submitted
that the ABA rules, in particular DR 2-101(B), may exceed the scope of
acceptable regulation of constitutionally protected speech by severely
limiting the manner, medium, and content of attorney advertising.
Although the task force did not provide a standard by which to
determine whether an advertisement is deceptive or misleading, it did
emphasize that an attorney, ever mindful of the sophistication of his
audience, should present reliable, accurate information in an objective
manner.14 1 Given the ABA's apparent desire to maintain tight control over
attorney advertising, it is probable that the standards for deception which
the bar ultimately engineers will be quite broad. Moreover, it is equally
probable that a broad definition of deception will be favorably received by
(12) Technical and professional licenses;
(13) Memberships in scientific, technical and professional
associations and societies;
(14) Foreign language ability;
(15) Names and addresses of bank references;
(16) With their written consent, names of clients regularly
represented;
(17) Prepaid or group legal services programs in which the
lawyer participates;
(18) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are
accepted;
(19) Office and telephone answering service hours;
(20) Fee for an initial consultation;
(21) Availability upon request for a written schedule of fees
and/or estimate of the fee to be charged for specific services;
(22) Contingent fee rates subject to DR 2-106(C), provided that
the statement discloses whether percentages are computed before or
after deduction of costs;
(23) Range of fees for services, provided that the statement
discloses that the specific fee within the range which will be charged
will vary depending upon the particular matter to be handled for each
client and the client is entitled without obligation an estimate of the
fee within the range likely to be charged, in print size equivalent to
the largest print used in setting forth the fee information;
(24) Hourly rate, provided that the statement discloses that the
total fee charged will depend upon the number of hours Which must be
devoted to the particular matter to be handled for each client and the
client is entitled to without obligation an estimate of the fee likely to
be charged, in print size at least equivalent to the largest print used in
setting forth the fee information;
(25) Fixed fees for specific legal services, the description of
which would not be misunderstood or be deceptive, provided that the
statement discloses that the quoted fee will be available only to clients
whose matters fall into the services described and that the client is
entitled without obligation to a specific estimate of the fee likely to be
charged in print size at least equivalent to the largest print used in
setting forth the fee information;
(footnotes omitted).
144. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2708-09 (1977).
145. See, e.g., Amendments, supra note 139, at 4 (EC 2-9).
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the courts. Since the public benefit derived from commercial speech is
contingent upon its reliability, there is no justification for permitting
misleading advertising.146 Furthermore, the Bates majority specified that
because the public lacks sophistication regarding the purchase of legal
services, misstatements that might be tolerated in other forms of advertising
might be inappropriate in attorney advertising. '47 Indeed, even in less
sensitive areas, government regulatory agencies have traditionally had
significant leeway when evaluating potentially false or deceptive advertis-
ing. For example, when scrutinizing suspect advertising, the Federal Trade
Commission considers the sophistication of the target audience, the overall
impression of the ad, and the possibility of multiple interpretations. 48
Despite its literal truth, an advertisement may be found to be false or
misleading if its total impression invites a misleading interpretation.' 49
Further, if only one of several possible constructions of the advertisement is
misleading, the advertisement can be considered deceptive.' 50 The FTC also
has the discretion to determine the meaning of an ad. This discretion is a
significant factor because it is a principal reason why the FTC has managed
to prevail in the appellate courts in the overwhelming majority of its
cases. 151
If government enjoys significant leeway when it regulates product
advertising, practical considerations dictate that it should have at least as
much authority and perhaps even more when regulating attorney advertis-
ing. One reason for increased regulatory power, is, as the Court noted, the
public's lack of sophistication with regard to legal services. 15 2 Another
reason is that, in the legal services industry, service performance is highly
uncertain, and consequently false claims are difficult to detect. Thus,
advertising by attorneys may provide a hospitable environment for fraud. 153
Not only should broad definitions of deceptive advertising be utilized, but
they must also be vigorously enforced. It has been suggested that moderate
enforcement of any law regulating deceptive advertising leads to an increase
in the presence of deceptive advertisements. Where consumers are aware of
the existence of government regulation, they are less apt to be suspicious of
an advertiser's claims.15 4 This increase in consumer confidence provides an
incentive for deceptive practices. Vigorously enforced laws, however, tend to
prevent deceptive practices by assuring that the advertiser is punished for
146. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
147. 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
148. See Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of
Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 675-76 (1977).
149. Id. at 676.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 677-78.
152. 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
153. See R. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE F.T.C. 8 (1973).
154. See Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POLITICAL ECON. 729, 749
(1974).
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his purposeful deception. 155 Thus, with regard to deceptive advertising by
attorneys, it is both likely and proper that the bar will regulate extensively
and vigorously.
Other aspects of the ABA amendments may, however, be viewed less
favorably by the courts. The manner restrictions of DR 2-101(B) will
undoubtedly present many close constitutional questions. Televised adver-
tisements are expressly prohibited unless the state authority which has
adopted the ABA Rules determines that televised broadcasts are necessary
to reach a significant segment of the public. 15 6 The mailing of circulars or
similar cards containing fee information is also prohibited. Moreover, the
rule allows only print media or radio advertising which is presented in a
dignified manner. Presumably, this would exclude the use of handbills and
billboards as well as such ostentatious mediums as electric signs and sound
trucks.
The constitutional status of the ban on televised attorney advertising
will certainly be a major issue. Indeed, the Bates Court was careful to note
that it was reserving judgment on this point. The Court did, however,
acknowledge that the special problems associated with electronic media
advertising would warrant special considerations. 157 Electronic media are
155. See id.
156. See Amendments, supra note 139, at 5 (DR 2-101(B) & (C)). ("[A] lawyer may
... broadcast over [the] radio . . . in the geographic area or areas in which the
lawyer resides or maintains offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's
clientele resides .... ") But see Amendments, supra note 139, at 3 (EC 2-2) where it is
stated that "[i]f the interests of lay persons in receiving relevant lawyer advertising
are not adequately served by print media and radio advertising, and if adequate
safeguards to protect the public can reasonable [sic] be formulated, television
advertising may serve a public interest." It must be noted that EC 2-2 is only a
regulation of ethical consideration and does not have the effect of a disciplinary rule.
Yet it is significant that the ABA has recognized that televised attorney advertising
could be a vital and necessary instrumentality which would facilitate the dissemina-
tion of information relevant to selecting a lawyer.
157. 97 S. Ct. at 2709. The Court cited Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F.
Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney
General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). There, a three judge district court upheld an F.C.C.
order which prohibited cigarette advertising on any electronic medium which was
subject to the jurisdiction of the F.C.C. The court rejected both the first amendment
and due process claims advanced by owners of radio stations who were challenging
the rule. The first amendment argument was rejected essentially because the two
member majority believed that commercial speech was entitled to little, if any,
constitutional protection. They noted that the broadcasters were not prohibited from
airing public interest spots devoted to the controversy but were forbidden only from
collecting revenue for carrying commercial advertisements. Id. at 584. However, in
light of Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976) and subsequent decisions, it is doubtful that this aspect of the case
retains force or validity.
On the due process point, the court felt that there was a rational basis for
permitting cigarette ads in print media while forbidding them on the electronics
media. They said that unlike print media which required an affirmative act to effect
communication, i.e., reading, broadcast messages are "in the air" and thus
immediately communicated. The court appeared to be leery of the power of the
1977]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
subject to considerable regulation by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion. Increased governmental regulation has traditionally been justified by
the need to ensure that all persons have equal access to this means of
communication because it is characterized as having a limited number of
channels. 158 If a policy reason for extensive regulation of the electronic
media is to ensure the public's right to be informed, it would seem contrary
to that policy to regulate the media so as to proscribe the dissemination of
constitutionally protected speech. This is especially true in light of the
Supreme Court's statements in Virginia Pharmacy,1 9 Linmark,' o and
Bates'6' that commercial speech is protected because it is valuable
information. Permissible televised attorney advertising, of course, would not
include deceptive or misleading content, and it is arguably true that
television is a more fertile medium for deceptive and self-laudatory ads than
are the print media. It is clear, however, that at least some televised attorney
advertisements would be no more deceptive than print media advertise-
ments. For example, a television advertisement which screened a card,
perhaps similar to the advertisement employed by Bates and O'Steen, and
featured an unseen announcer who merely read the card, complete with any
required disclaimers, would seem to present no additional potential for
deception. Thus, despite the argument that television may pose special
problems regarding deception, a ban of all televised attorney advertising
would have to overcome strong constitutional objections.
DR 2-101(B) restricts all advertisements to radio or print media, and
requires that they be presented in a dignified manner. It is not clear whether
the rule would prohibit advertising via handbills or posters. Yet it is
probable that the task force would not consider the use of billboards, electric
signs or soundtrucks to come within the ambit of permissible advertising.
Although the Bates Court did note that attorney advertisements may be
subject to time, place, and manner regulations, 162 these regulations must not
be drafted with the purpose of suppressing speech of a particular content.
The ABA manner regulations will be upheld only if the purpose of the
regulations is to prevent an evil which is unrelated to the idea communi-
cated. 163 If the requirement that advertisements be dignified is interpreted to
apply to the content of the advertisement, so as to prevent certain ideas from
being published, then it is possible that the regulation will be considered a
suppression of speech. If, however, only the manner in which the
advertisement is to be presented must be dignified, then it would appear that
the state's purpose would be to prevent commercialization of the profession,
electronic medium warning of the "subliminal impact" of its "pervasive propaganda."
333 F. Supp. at 585-86. Presumably, it is this problem which troubles the Supreme
Court and has convinced it that it would be wise to tread carefully in this area.
158. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943);
National Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 516 F.2d 1101, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
159. 425 U.S. 748, 764-65 (1976).
160. 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977).
161. 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2699 (1977).
162. Id. at 2709.
163. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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and any infringement upon expression would be only incidental. If the
disciplinary rule infringes only incidentally upon speech, a less rigorous
balancing test will be applied to determine its constitutionality. 6 4 Yet even
if the dignity requirement is found to apply only to the manner of
advertising, it would appear likely that some mediums other than those
included in a narrow reading of "print media" should properly be allowed to
carry attorney advertisements. Indeed, Justice Powell, in his dissenting
opinion in Bates, indicated that he could discern no reason for distinguish-
ing between the publication of attorney advertisements in newspapers, and
their publication in "a rather broad spectrum of other . . . [media], for
example magazines, signs in buses and subways, posters, handbills, and
mail circulations.'
165
It is possible, however, that the exact extent to which the bar may
regulate the time, place, and manner of attorney advertisements will not be
known for some time. Ordinarily, the requirement that advertisements be
dignified would be the object of attack by a plaintiff alleging that this is an
overbroad proscription which results in the chilling of first amendment
rights. The issue would be whether application of DR 2-101 would be
substantially overbroad in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep. The
Court, however, has held that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply where
commercial speech is involved. Therefore, the inquiry will focus upon the
specific advertisement which is the subject of the case. The result will be a
decision that determines the constitutionality only of a particular advertise-
ment rather than the facial validity of the time, place, or manner restriction.
Several such adjudications may be necessary before it is clear whether a
particular regulatory scheme is tenable.
Finally, the disciplinary rules also appear to prohibit the mailing of
circulars advertising fee information. 66 If this restriction is challenged it is
likely that the bar would contend that the mailing of circulars constitutes
solicitations rather than mere advertising, and therefore this specific
prohibition is not affected by the Bates decision. Yet the Bates case noted
only that "in-person solicitations" in situations which breed "undue
influence," such as solicitations at the hospital or the accident site, might
pose real dangers of over-reaching and misrepresentation.' 6 7 Moreover, the
Court has often cautioned that a state may not foreclose the exercise of
constitutional rights by the attachment of mere labels. 68 Thus, the
prohibition on the mailing of circulars might well pose first amendment
problems.
164. See note 11 supra.
165. 97 S. Ct. at 2718 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
166. See Amendments, supra n.139, at 6 (DR 2-102(A)(2)).
167. 97 S. Ct. at 2700.
168. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). The Court will have an
opportunity to clarify its position on solicitation this term. Appeals have been filed in
In Re Smith, 233 S.E.2d 301 (S.C. 1977), appeal docketed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3041 (U.S. Aug.
8, 1977) (No. 77-56) and in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 48 Ohio St. 2d 217, 357
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Ultimately, the fate of the ABA amendments, as well as a state's rules
on attorney advertising, will depend upon the way courts interpret Bates.
Despite Justice Blackmun's attempt to fashion a narrow decision, it
appears that there is substantial disagreement regarding the scope of that
case. Some commentators feel that only false or misleading attorney
advertisements can be prohibited, 169 yet the trend exhibited by those in
whom the responsibility for redrafting the rules regulating attorney
advertising is vested has been to opt for a narrow reading of Bates.170 Given
the slim majority in Bates and the sensitive nature of the subject matter, it
is likely that many courts will narrowly construe the scope of permissible
attorney advertising. Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court's discussion of
the common sense differences of commercial speech, it is also likely that
substantial control over the time, place, and manner of the distribution of
attorney advertising will ultimately be constitutional. If, however, those
N.E.2d 1097 (1976), appeal docketed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3824 (U.S. June 21, 1977) (No.
76-1650).
In Smith, an ACLU attorney contacted persons who had been sterilized,
allegedly as a condition precedent to receiving medicaid benefits, and offered the
services of the ACLU in bringing damage actions against the physicians who
performed the operations. The attorney was reprimanded for violating the ABA's ban
on solicitation. He has challenged the reprimand on first amendment as well as other
grounds.
The Ohralik case involves an attorney who was indefinitely suspended from
the practice of law for violating a provision of the Ohio Code of Professional
Responsibility forbidding solicitation of clients. The attorney was suspended after he
visited two victims of an automobile accident, one in the hospital and the other in her
home, and solicited and obtained agreements to represent them in litigation arising
out of the accident. He alleges that Ohio's total ban on solicitation is a violation of the
first amendment.
169. See Freedman, Bates Comes to Town, D.C. and the Supreme Court Decision
on Advertising, 2 DIST. LAWYER 24, 28 (1977).
170. See, e.g., THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND STANDING COMMITTEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 61ST REPORT (undated) (proposed amendment
to Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility) (allowing publication of prescribed
data only in newspapers and periodicals).
Shortly before this Note went to press, the Maryland Court of Appeals, the
body with the ultimate responsibility for regulating the practice of law in Maryland,
rejected the proposed amendments submitted by the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure. Court of Appeals of Maryland, Notice of Proposed Rules
Action, Maryland Rules of Procedure, Appendix F, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, The Daily Record, Jan. 14, 1978, at 2 col. 1. After considering the 61st
Report, as well as oral and written comments received as a result of a public hearing
held. on December 1, 1977, the Court of Appeals 'drafted its own set of proposed
amendments to Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Id.
The amendments proposed by the Court of Appeals would, if adopted in toto,
be the most liberal rules governing attorney advertising in effect anywhere in the
United States. The proposed amendments are similar in concept to the ABA's
Proposal B, see Amendments, supra note 139, at 2, that is, they are directive rather
than regulatory. Yet the Maryland amendments appear to allow the advertising
attorney even more leeway than did proposal B. For unlike the ABA's proposal, they
do not contain an exhaustive and limiting list of examples of deceptive or misleading
statements or claims. Furthermore, the rules proposed by the Court of Appeals seem to
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controls are actually suppressions of speech, where the control is enacted
because of the feared effect which that speech will have on those who receive
it, then a court will and should declare the regulation unconstitutional.
permit televised attorney advertisements, which both ABA Proposals prohibited. The
Maryland rules would forbid only:
[A]dvertisement or other public communication containing information about
the services of particular lawyers or law firms which:
(1) contains a misstatement of fact;
(2) is likely to mislead or deceive because in context it makes only a partial
disclosure of relevant facts;
(3) is intended or is likely to create false or unjustified expectations of
favorable results;
(4) contains any other statement that is intended or likely to cause a
reasonable person to misunderstand or be deceived; or
(5) constitutes, is part of, or is a device for carrying out, an otherwise
unlawful act.
Id. Although it is likely that members of the Maryland Bar will be quite critical of
these proposed amendments, it is the position of this Note that the Court of Appeals
acted commendably, and that the legal profession, as well as the consumer public, will
ultimately benefit from the flow of information which these liberal rules would permit.
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